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13.1 The French Press Landscape
The French press has been facing significant economic problems over time. It is
called to be in a state of agony or severe and chronic crisis at least. No wonder then
that the French State has been intervening into its print media sector rather
generously and at length. It would probably not have survived without the many
forms of state-mandated cash handouts to keep its ailing print media industry afloat.
However, as the title of our chapter indicates, many of these current state
subsidies are more than controversial and thus needed to be analysed carefully
and in depth.
The French press is at present regulated by a complex body of press legislation,
whose roots may be found in Article XI of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen. However, it was not until the Law of 29 July 1881 that the
principle of a free press was institutionalized, guaranteeing freedom of opinion and
according the right to publish and disseminate information freely without prior
restraint through any state authority. The extremely liberal Law of 29 July 1881 was
overturned by two major legislative pieces of 1944, and 1986, formulating a stop-
and-go policy of both liberal, low-interventionist and strict, high-interventionist
press regulation policies. During the Second World War, the provisional govern-
ment of 1944 announced three orders to protect the press both from government
interference and from financial pressures and subordination to commercial
interests. Although the immediate post-Liberation period saw a sharp increase in
the total print run of daily newspapers, showing an apparently healthy condition of
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the French press, this post-war boom was short-lived: newspaper sales soon began
to decline and the number of titles and copies per 1,000 inhabitants contracted,
punctuated by only sporadic bursts of growth (Albert 2008).
The core transformation with regard to state intervention occurred at the end of
the Second World War, between 1944 and 1947: the Liberation movement has
settled an extensive public system designed to regulate and financially and politi-
cally support newspaper firms which then faced major shortenings of required
resources for normally operating a newspaper business (paper, printings, and distri-
bution). Since 1947, the French State has thus played a major role in the economy of
the press industry through a full-scale interventionist regulation system, which, up
until today, has especially included a range of both direct and indirect public
financial subsidies (Santini 1966; de Tarle´ 1980; Charon 1991; Eveno 2008).
Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, the French press has been subjected
to fundamental changes, the foremost of which are major economic problems as
evidenced in falling advertising revenues and increasing costs, with unfavourable
production techniques and an underdeveloped distribution system, leading to
extraordinarily high sales prices and readers deserting the press (Albert 2008).
Significantly, while French regulators in the 1980s claimed to be preoccupied
with efforts to limit concentration and thwart the voracious appetite of domestic
press barons, today’s emphasis has shifted to enabling French media empires to
grow sufficiently large and prosperous to compete with international rivals.
The French press structure is very complex. It is, however, appropriate to typify
three segments of newspapers in France:
1. The national daily press of general and political news (abbreviated as PQN,
i.e. la presse quotidienne nationale), which remains an important segment of
the industry even though it was heavily and first hit by the newspaper crisis,
losing 7.0 % for total paid-for dailies between 2007 and 2011 (WAN-IFRA
2011). The PQN segment includes the daily opinion press which has practically
disappeared, with the remaining newspapers adopting a more neutral tone and
limiting political commentaries to editorial articles and op-ed pages.
2. Regional daily newspapers (abbreviated as PQR, i.e. la presse quotidienne re´
gionale), published in the morning and circulated throughout the 22 metropoli-
tan regions and the 96 metropolitan departments, which are in a much healthier
state than the PQN.
3. The periodical press (la presse magazine, e.g. L’Express, Le Nouvel
Observateur), represented by four major general weekly news magazines as
well as other press products of specialist nature, together with a family which is
spurred by a financial boom and editorial variety and has succeeded in offsetting
the national dailies’ poor economic performance and the regionals’ tendency
towards concentration of ownership.
The following Table 13.1 shows titles, political orientation, and paid-for circu-
lation of daily newspapers for 2012. Le Figaro, Le Monde, and Libe´ration are the
daily information press’s most important titles. However, their influence on domes-
tic public opinion has waned rather dramatically. Today, the PQN is in dire straits
and, according to Professor Toussaint-Desmoulins, suffers from “several factors
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whose negative effects cumulate: (1) a fall of circulation and readership; (2) weak
and irregular advertising revenues; (3) badly controlled production and distribu-
tion costs; (4) a high selling price; and (5) increased dependency on state
subsidies” (Toussaint-Desmoulins 2002, p. 97). On top, there are further variables
which aggravate the deep structural crisis of the French press: concentration and the
reader’s further disentanglement with its press on a broad scale. The media and
defence conglomerate Lagardere, for example, has become one of the main
shareholders of one of France’s most respected dailies, Le Monde, and, in 2005,
the leftist Libe´ration was rescued from bankruptcy by the financier Edouard de
Rothschild. Despite protestations on the part of the new financial backers of these
two papers and Le Figaro that they had no intention of attempting to influence
editorial content, the restructuring of the titles coincided with the departure of
several long-standing and respected editors.
On the other hand, it is more than noteworthy that the Rennes-based regional
daily Ouest-France sells more copies than any other French daily paper and has
been relatively unaffected by the decline in circulation that has bedevilled the
national press over the last half-century, reaching 2.5 million readers daily (and a
circulation of almost 750,000 units).
The following Table 13.2 shows France’s free daily newspapers and their circu-
lation as of 2012, again as measured by OJD, the French audit bureau of circulation.
Table 13.3 shows the five most popular daily regional newspapers in France,
numbers for paid circulation and the covered area of distribution (as of 2012).
To present the French governance scheme of state aid for newspapers first
requires locating the nexus of issues firmly into its historical context. To organize
this chapter, we shall attempt to provide a historical overview of major
developments of the French press subsidy scheme. After reviewing major state
and government initiatives and their effects on the country’s print media landscape,
Table 13.1 Daily newspapers in France—Title, editorial orientation, and circulation
Title Editorial orientation Paid-for circulation
Le Figaro Right-of-centre 332,064a
Le Monde Centre 317,742a
L’E´quipe Sports 287,233a
Aujourd’hui en France Right-of-centre 180,916
Libe´ration Left 128,122a
Les E´chos Financial 122,669
La Croix Catholic 86,160
L’Humanite´ Communist 44,904b
Pre´sent Far-right 2,500c
Source: OJD (2012), diffusion France & e´tranger paye´e (paid circulation in France and abroad)
Numbers are a mean of paid-for daily circulation in France and abroad, between July 2011 and
June 2012
aIncluding digital version
bData from publisher (not approved by OJD)
cFigure 2011 (Direction ge´ne´rale des medias, de l’information et de la communication, Ministe`re
de la Culture et de la Communication)
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we shall eventually offer some critical discussion and acclaim of the scheme, a
scheme that is as old as 1944.
13.2 Press Subsidies: The Early Phase
13.2.1 The First General Laws
The French press is based on Article XI of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen. The Declaration opens by affirming “the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man” to “liberty, property, security and resistance to
oppression”. The article 11 states: “The free communication of ideas and opinions
is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly,
speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this
freedom as shall be defined by law”.
However, it was not until the Law of 29 July 1881 that the principle of a free
press was included in the French Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of expression
and speech and according the right to publish and disseminate information freely
without prior restraint through any state authority. The legislation on the press came
to limit the abuse of freedom (press offences, defamation) and promote free
expression and consumption of the printed press. In the following, a flood of
publications was unleashed, pushed by technological innovation and pulled by a
strong increase in demand for newspapers.
The extremely liberal Law of 1881 was overturned by the three major legislative
push phases, formulating a steady but myriad growth policy of press subsidization.
Table 13.2 Free daily newspapers in France: publication title, number of editions, and distributed
circulation
Publication title Distributed circulation
20 Minutes (13 editions) 1,017,633
Direct Matin (12 editions) 918,308
Metro (10 editions) 747,194
Source: OJD 2012, circulation as measured in November 2012
Table 13.3 The big five daily regional newspapers in France
Publication title Paid circulation Covered area
Ouest France 748,394a 12 Departments/North West
Sud Ouest 285,932a 8 Departments/South West
Le Parisien 282,805 8 Departments/the Great Paris/Ile-de-France (and Oise)
La Voix du Nord 255,796a 2 Department/North
Le Dauphine´ Libe´re´ 225,832a 9 Departments/South East
Source: OJD (2012), diffusion France paye´e
Numbers are a mean of paid-for daily circulation in France, taken between July 2011 and June
2012
aData from publisher (not approved by OJD)
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13.2.2 The Liberation Period (1944–1947): Regulating Press
Freedom
The government run by Pierre Laval—the chief of government owned a local
newspaper himself—initiated the first drive for press support during the Second
World War under the Nazi German occupation. Basically, today’s scheme still
strongly refers to this period.
In mid-1944, the French press needed to be rebuilt (Beuve-Me´ry 1947). Most
newspapers had been closed in 1940 to avoid operating under the control of Nazis.
During the Liberation period, the French government defended the following
legitimate goal: the end of the Second World War imposed the need to rebuild
the whole Nation and this need also affected to entirely restructure the press from
scratch to fit the new political, economic, and social conditions. This nation-
building exercise was supported by the hopes and aspirations of many French
Resistance fighters to become journalists and run newspapers themselves, quite in
coincidence with their support of the new government and elites coming from the
French Resistance movement itself. However, they did not own any printing
machines or newsrooms and property rights of newspapers, so that creating a
newspaper from scratch required time and equity. Thus, only one solution seemed
to match: by order of the ordinances of 6 May 1944 and 30 September 1944,
newspapers identified as collaborating with Nazi Germany were expropriated and
their property transferred to organizations of the French Resistance. These were
selected by government and top civil servants (Hisard 1955).
From 1944 to 1947, French government and parliament were mainly run by
individuals coming from the French Resistance movement and implemented
policies defined by the Resistance spirit (promoting values of fraternity, generosity,
and idealism) (Jacquemart 1948; Viannay 1988). Effectively, the laws on press
taken between 1944 and 1947 contributed to protect the press from intervention of
political power, but also financial pressures and commercial dependencies. Further,
these first instances to build a subsidy scheme were also characterized by the
pooling of printing paper purchase, the transfer of power to run printing offices
(for national dailies) to printing trade unions (in particular, CGT, the Confe´de´ration
Ge´ne´rale du Travail, long affiliated to the French Communist party), and the
pooling of the nationwide distribution system (for dailies and magazines).
Among the laws enacted in these years, we shall emphasize the most significant
set of “1944–1947 Ordinances” (Eveno 2003; Martin 1997) as follows:
• The rules of the Ordinances of 22 and 26 August 1944 set forth the economic,
financial, and moral standard of the new press industry which intend to protect
press from financial and economic pressures and to promote the diversity of
opinion; in particular, these ordinances strictly forbade monopolies and press
companies’ integration and merger (i.e. a single person is not allowed to own
more than one newspaper).
• The rules of ordinance of 25 November 1944 authorized the Ministry of Infor-
mation to set the cover price of a newspaper issue.
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• The rules of law of 2 April 1947 (called the Loi Bichet) first legalized the
freedom of press distribution and put it under the monitoring of a cooperative:
the former NMPP later became Presstalis (100 % owned by Press publishers’
cooperatives). NMPP distributed most national newspapers and nearly 80 % of
magazines and multimedia products. This cooperative system gives every pub-
lisher and press outlet an equal nationwide access to newsstands.
Although this Liberation legislation was supposed to support pluralism and
forbid concentration of newspapers ownership, the regional daily press could
never be prevented from a de facto monopoly in almost every region of France.
The first newspaper—whose publishers and editors were coming from the French
Resistance—to be established in the Liberation period benefited from the first-
mover advantage and strong barriers of entry into this market (Eveno 2003; Le
Floch 1997; Le Floch and Sonnac 2005; Martin 2005; Pigasse 1975; Servan-
Schreiber 1972; Texier 2006; Toussaint-Desmoulins 1978/2008).
13.2.3 The Post-Liberation Period (1947–1958): Indirect Support
After the newspaper revival petered out by 1950, leaving the country with a
permanent sense of imminent doom in its newspaper industry, all professional
organizations of the press, principally the federal newspaper association of the
French press (Fe´de´ration nationale de la presse franc¸aise, FNPF), and various
trade union associations addressed the government with a memorandum, asking for
support from the state in the interest of free circulation of information. Although
newspapers had already benefited from preferential postal tariffs since the French
Revolution, the persistent economic problems of the press had to be answered with
an extension of support measures. As a result, the post-Liberation administration of
the Fourth Republic (1946–1958) came out with preferential tariffs for post and
telecommunications, a 50 % reduction for newspaper delivery by the SNCF (Socie´
te´ nationale des chemins de fer franc¸ais), the French national rail operator, an
exemption of half of the taxes on newspapers’ turnover, and investment benefits.
Created in 1948, the subsidy for distribution by rail still operates in 2012 and
consists of an annual agreement between the SNCF and the state by which state
refunds the SNCF as compensation for reduced tariffs for newspaper delivery.
Dating back to the French Revolution of 1789 (Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen) and enacted as law in 1796 (loi du 4 Thermidor an IV) with various
other legal stipulations following, state support for postal delivery of daily
newspapers is thought of as an important service to the French reading public. La
Poste uses a regular list of subscribers which have to conform to criteria of
frequency of publication and nature of delivery [benefits from a reduced tariff
when first having received a certificate of selection from the Commission paritaire
des publications et agences de presse (CPPAP), a state-structured press regulatory
agency created by decree on 25 March 1950 that is equally composed by five
ministries’ delegates and press industry representatives].
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Against what was planned as a non-discriminatory regime, based on objective
criteria, changes were introduced in 1974 by offering most preferential tariffs to
daily newspapers of general and political information with a circulation of less than
150,000 copies which weigh less than 100 g and, importantly, have less than 20 %
advertising volume.
As promulgated by the “General Code on Taxes” (articles 72 et 73 du
paragraphe III du Code ge´ne´ral des impoˆts) on 29 December 1976, it was finally
decided that newspapers recognized by the CPPAP should benefit from a reduced
rate of 7 % on paper, ink, editorial copy, outside composition and printing, and
subscription to news agencies with the beginning of 1977. Even more reduced was
newspapers’ VAT on income from sales, which was subject to rebate based on the
frequency of publication and advertising volume, thus mainly privileging dailies by
taxing them by a rate of 2.1 % on their cover price, and all others with 4 %. On top
of that, some non-dailies of general and political information, which were
distributed in the provinces or regions and appeared at least once a week and
whose cover price did not exceed 75 % of the majority of dailies, were equally
allowed a VAT rate reduced to 2.1 %. When the government finally came to extend
the favourable rate of 2.1 % to even national weeklies of political character in 1987,
last hurdles fell to reduce the 7 % rate to 5.5 % and, more importantly, to fix a rate of
2.1 % as VAT on sales revenues on single copy and sales on subscription for all of
the print press when granted an inscription number by the CPPAP. The financial
law of 1989 finally created a permanent legal basis for these fiscal advantages, to be
financed by the general annual budget. In 2012, the press still benefits from this
reduced rate of VAT (2.1 %, with an even more reduced rate of 1.05 % for delivery
to French overseas departments and territories).
Further, print and online newspaper publishers and, under certain conditions,
printers, distributors, and press agencies are exempted from professional tax (now
called “property tax”) (article 1458 du Code ge´ne´ral des impoˆts). On top of that,
newspapers are released from paying tax on their invested profits (article 39 bis A
du Code ge´ne´ral des impoˆts). Already introduced in 1945 and originally
conceptualized for only 1 year but then renewed annually, this form of support
intends to make it easier for newspapers to purchase all necessary equipment and
facilities.
13.2.4 Since 1972: Direct Support for Pluralism
Following the Serise´-report in 1972, a first government report of a working
group analysing state aid to the press appeared as a result of which help was
directed to daily newspapers with weak financial resources. Introduced in 1972,
renewed in 1982, and institutionalized in a decree on 12 March 1986, this assistance
fund for national dailies of general and political interest with low advertising
resources (Fonds d’aide aux quotidiens a` faibles ressources publicitaires) provided
cash to newspapers in the form of an extraordinary operating subsidy in order
to safeguard the economic survival and promote pluralism. This subsidy still
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existed in 2012—important modification has been added in 1998, and a last
modification dates from 13 April 2012—and is reserved for publications which
satisfy in particular the following conditions (as of December 2012):
• French language newspapers
• General and political interest publications
• National newspapers
• Newspapers published at least five times a week
• Newspapers printed on newsprint
• Newspapers with a print run of under 250,000 copies
• Newspapers with sales lower than 150,000 copies
• Newspapers whose cover price range from 80 % to 130 % of the average cover
price of all national dailies of general and political interest
• Newspapers with advertising revenues lower than 25 % of their overall annual
incomes
In 2012, 9.1 million euros had been given out. Main beneficiaries are the
following: The close to Communist Party’s daily L’Humanite´ (3.1 million euros),
the catholic daily La Croix, the left-of-centre daily Libe´ration (2.9 million euros),
and the far-right daily Pre´sent also received 227,000 euros (Franc¸aix 2012).
Similarly, an assistance fund for daily provincial (i.e. regional, departmental,
and local) general and political interest newspapers with low revenues from classi-
fied advertisements (le fonds d’aide aux quotidiens re´gionaux, de´partementaux et
locaux d’information politique et ge´ne´rale a` faibles ressources de petites annonces)
was introduced by decree on 28 July 1989. This subsidy still exists in 2012 and is
dedicated to publications which satisfy in particular the following general
conditions (as of 2012):
• Newspapers with a print run of under 70,000 copies.
• Newspapers whose cover price of the most-run local edition is inferior to 130 %
of the average cover price of regional and local general and political interest
newspapers.
Further, the beneficiaries should satisfy the specific conditions of one of two
following options:
1. First:
• Paying sales inferior to 60,000 copies.
• Not be the most important circulated newspaper in the covered area.
• Advertising revenues coming from classifieds inferior to 5 % of overall
revenues.
2. Second:
• Paying sales inferior to 50,000 copies.
• Advertising revenues coming from classifieds inferior to 15 % of overall
revenues.
• More than 25 % of the overall paid circulation is supplied for by subscription
and postal delivery.
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13.3 Press Subsidies: The Saturation Phase
As a reflex of still close ties between the political classes and the press, the French
government has expanded and improved a system of public aid to the press in a
skilful fashion. With the help of various press commissions, established to report on
the development of the press sector, French public policy activity performs on a
high level of expansive interventionist mechanisms, scarcely surprising in a politi-
cal culture and system where the ethos and practice of e´tatisme have played, and
continue to play, a key role in its internal affairs. In a symptom of the state as rule
maker and enforcer of press matters, the former director of the French Press
Institute and author of numerous works on the French press, Pierre Albert, has
pointed to the differences of other policy approaches to the French way of
regulating the press as follows: “As for the role of the State, in France, it is the
exact opposite of its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In the United States or in England,
freedom of expression is considered the natural sequel to ‘laissez faire’, which
means that the market rules the world of information, that any regulatory infringe-
ment is considered as intolerable, letting the judges dispose of any excesses under
common law proceedings. In France, with the tradition of Roman law, the press
asks for the law to guarantee its freedom in the name of the necessary protection of
pluralism against the eventual excesses of the powers of money: the media cannot
be treated as ordinary products or goods for the simple reason that they perform a
public service. (. . .) While certain State subsidies are, for us, considered as a
natural contribution of the collectivity to safeguard the press’ pluralism, they are
across the Channel - and even more so, across the Atlantic, - considered as a soft-
core form of corruption of the paper’s independence” (Albert 1994, p. 3).
State-sponsored subsidy measures aiming at offering access to information for
all citizens in order to stimulate their participation in public life have undergone a
series of changes in nature and extent over time, following changes of the respon-
sible political forces. Budgeted either within the general service of the Prime
Minister (until 1986 and after 1990), or attached to the budget of the Ministry of
Culture and Communication (from 1987 to 1990), subsidies to the daily press were
steadily increased from 1985 to 1989. In the summer of 1995, the new government
decided to abolish above Ministry and transferred all press affairs to the Ministry of
Culture, also then responsible for postal service affairs and new communications
technologies. Between 1985 and 1989, total financial subsidies increased by 2.9 %,
following increases in the general state budget. Direct subsidies were up by 39.1 %
and indirect subsidies up by 1.7 %. It is noteworthy that total direct subsidies
accounted for only 4.5 % of total subsidies, so stressing the government’s prefer-
ence for indirect subsidies.1 Indirect subsidies are not contained in the national
1 If direct subsidies to national and regional dailies of limited advertising resources were to be
accounted as “real” direct subsidies, and the other positions the authorities call direct subsidies
were not taken into account, the percentage of these “real” subsidies were even reduced to a
minuscule 1.2 % of total subsidies.
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budget as they do not involve cash payments and are therefore more difficult to
assess with precision.
Then Prime Minister Edouard Balladur’s initiative to produce a special govern-
ment rescue plan of altogether French francs 200 million for the written press in
1993 was regarded as vital by many observers to foster a market shaken by an
economic downswing in advertising, under-capitalization of companies, escalating
production costs, and a disconnected readership.
13.3.1 The First “Sarkozy Plan” of State Aid to the Press (1995)
Soon after Alain Carignon announced his demission as minister of communication
from the Balladur government, finance minister Nicolas Sarkozy took over com-
mand of press affairs in July 1994 and affirmed his intention to prepare efficient and
transparent changes in the economic regime of the subsidy scheme with a view to
resolving the burning issues ahead. What sat right at the centre of Sarkozy’s
concerns was the desire to assess the efficacy of what he called “an archaic system”
which had to be freed from its dust, thus to gradually relocate its main principle of
non-discrimination among its beneficiaries and its culture of pure state dependency.
Practically speaking, Sarkozy tackled three main areas of re-evaluation (a) the
development of distribution, (b) the defence of pluralism, and (c) the reduction of
papers’ escalating operating costs.
Sarkozy then came to announce the following ten measures of change in the
fiscal, social, and distributional characteristics of the old regime:
• First measure: Reduction in social security contributions for hawkers and vendors
of newspapers. To accelerate daily newspapers’ postal delivery to French
households in the early morning, a mere 140,000 copies out of 2.2 million were
delivered into the home by December 1994, Sarkozy advocated a reduction of
compulsory social security payments for home deliverers from 6 to 4 % in
accordancewith theMinister of Social Affairs (Bonnet,Libe´ration, 26/1/95, p. 47).
• Second measure: Exemption of social security contributions for hawkers and
vendors of daily national newspapers for 5 years in order to stimulate the
particularly underdeveloped home delivery of Parisian newspapers, further to
create local delivery structures and complementary dispatches.
• Third measure: Contribution to the modernization of distribution costs.
Sarkozy’s concern over distribution, equally shared by publishers as they gener-
ally account for up to 25 % of their total costs of daily newspaper production
(Toussaint-Desmoulins 1987, p. 45), stimulated Sarkozy’s impetus and centred
on the second working group’s results of noticing the rather drastic disappear-
ance of selling points over the years, the prohibitive costs of postal delivery of
newspapers, and the low percentage of home delivery of particularly the national
daily press. Mastering the exorbitant distribution costs of newspapers was first
addressed by injecting 140 million French francs into the modernization of the
dominant player in national newspaper distribution, the Nouvelle Messageries de
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la Presse Parisienne (NMPP), owned by the powerful industrial conglomerate
Matra-Hachette by 49 % and controlling one-third of total distribution of the
press and half of the kiosk business, with the objective of facilitating early
retirement of 374 of its employees (Junqua 1995, pp. 72–73). On top of that,
negotiations on early retirement plans between trade associations and the pow-
erful trade union, the Syndicat du Livre-CGT, already initiated in 1992, were
backed by a sweetener of 385 million French francs to the Paris press, to be
spread over 9 years, thereby cutting 872 employees at the end of 1995 with the
aim of bringing down the operating costs of newspapers.2 The modernization
plan concerning the NMPP, to be effected from 1994 to 1997, further set out two
other goals: qualitatively, an improvement in services and thus productivity, and,
second, the reduction of the NMPP’s average cost of intervention from 14 to
9 %, with the objective to reduce the average cover price of dailies and
periodicals by 10 %, thus aiming at economies of 800 million French francs
beneficial to all publishers going with the NMPP. Costs for the state were
estimated at 105 million French francs for 8 years (Lambert 1996, pp. 50–51).
• Fourth measure: Exemptions from the professional tax on newspapers
distributors. As for reversing the trend of kiosks’ closures, counted 500 yearly,
Sarkozy proposed fiscal advantages for kiosk vendors on the basis of exempting
each from their professional tax by an average of 2,000 French francs per annum.
This measure was designed to exempt 50 % of distributors from professional tax.
• Fifth measure: Moratorium on the VAT rate of 2.1 %. Sarkozy rejected
publishers’ demands for reducing VAT on newspapers sales by single copy
and subscription by pointing to the EU’s intended plan to harmonize VAT across
the EU at 5.5 %. Publishers acquiesced in Sarkozy’s offer for a moratorium.
• Sixth measure: Extension of the framework of social plans to regional dailies.
Here, the government supported frameworks of social plans of regional weeklies
in order to develop stable conditions for plans of early retirement in printing.
• Seventh measure: Doubling of the two funds to dailies of low advertising
resources. “Defence of pluralism” located the ethical reference point for
Sarkozy’s emphasis in providing a lifeboat for the national dailies of low
financial resources. In practice, the assistance funds for national dailies of
general and political interest with low advertising resources would be doubled
from 18 million to 36 million French francs.
• Eighth measure: Propositions aiming at making the field of applications for state
aid more precise. Sarkozy ordered the re-examination of the total number of
certified publications inscribed at the CPPAP as well as the limitation of validity
of the certificates to 5 years.
• Ninth measure: Establishment of a permanent loan fund for new investments.
This loan fund was introduced to alleviate investments into new technologies
2 Interestingly, to facilitate the financial restructuring of the recession-stricken press, the minister
also announced to guarantee half of the adverts for the government’s privatization plans to be
placed in newspapers. See Le Figaro, Un soutien financier exceptionnel, 13/1/94.
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and multimedia operations in order to support an equivalence of 3 % of financial
costs of projects submitted. The fund was endowed with 20 million French
francs for a period of 5 years.
• Tenth measure: Establishment of a fund supporting the weekly regional press of
general and political information. Endowed with 5 million French francs, this
fund was aimed at supporting weekly regional newspapers with low advertising
resources (Rapport Lambert, pp. 23–24).
After the presidential elections and the change in government in May 1995, and
press affairs subsequently being aligned to the Ministry of Culture under the
auspices of incoming Philippe Douste-Blazy, the first Sarkozy plan was expected
to be brought to successful conclusion. Despite continuing problems of the press
and a flurry of demands addressed from industry leaders to the president and the
government, the authorities threw into doubt their future engagement as active
agents in the field of information by dissipating various forms of support, moves
which have resulted in unease that crept into the relationship between the state and
the press.3 Bitterness in the relations between the national press and the govern-
ment deepened when the government later decided to put the knife on the projected
funds for 1996 and especially failed to deliver Sarkozy’s promise to double direct
help to the national dailies with limited advertising resources, in order to come out
with new but cheaper instruments.4
Later, President Jacques Chirac’s decision to re-examine the mechanisms of
support in order to make them more effective came as another reminder that old
guarantees of financial support were continuously to be thinned out. Although total
subsidies were increased by 4.1 % in 1996, with national and regional dailies with
limited advertising resources benefiting most, long-engrained privileges were
steadily dismantled. Most importantly, journalists were stripped off their yearly
income tax breaks of 30 % of their first 50,000 French francs (ca. 15,000 euros), a
fiscal privilege granted since 1934, sparking off protest strikes on many of the
national and regional newspapers, among them Libe´ration, L’Humanite´, and Le
Monde in October 1996. Given the then profound crisis of the national daily press,
the difficulties of public spending as extra austerity measures were brought in, as
well as a further liberalization of postal services pending, new support measures
seemed only to bottom out a subsidy regime which was continuously downgraded
and cut across the board.
3Mutual accusations culminated in Chirac’s move to campaign for his presidency in the strong
regional daily La Voix du Nord, not failing to criticize the national dailies of denigrating the
government. See Lloyd (1997). The French are said to be in a bad mood, but perhaps it is their
press which is miserable. Prospect, January 1997, p. 69.
4 A projected budget increase in 8.8 % would have resulted in direct help of 287 million French
francs. See de Gasquet (1995). Juppe´ n’envisage pas d’aide conjoncturelle a` la presse. Les E´chos,
30/8/95.
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13.4 Press Subsidies: The Crisis Phase
13.4.1 The Late 1990s
In 1999, Government created the “FDM—Fonds d’aide a` la modernisation de la
presse quotidienne et assimile´e d’information politique et ge´ne´rale” (a special fund
to grant projects of modernization into printing presses and newsroom facilities of
the news press), later endowed with 25 million euros in 2010 (about 5 % of overall
direct aids), the FDM was designed to increase productivity of the press, drive
innovation in editorial content production, and enhance readership.
At the same time as the state sought to encourage newspapers to modernize and
invest in new technologies, it also sought to support them in their policy of reducing
overstaffing in print. The Plan de Modernisation Sociale was part of the FDM but
had a different focus: It aimed to help social modernization in order to adjust labour
productivity in the printing plants.
The FDM had several impacts. Most importantly, aid for modernization of
printing and, to a lesser extent, for the development of the online offerings emerged
as the two main tracks of subsidization which exercised the greatest influence on
revenues. Beyond the leverage effect that had been highlighted in the previous
reports on the FDM, it emerged that 1 euros of public money directly triggered an
investment level of 4 euros out of private budgets. In this respect, the FDM more
than achieved its goal.
However, many questions remained concerning the investments subsidized and
the mode of governance of the FDM. First, beyond the fact that a number of
subsidized investments in the FDM seemed to have no impact on particularly,
EBITDA many questions remained about the effectiveness of aid for the moderni-
zation of printing. First, measures of productivity gains actually obtained by
newspapers were not in sight. Similar to all previous reports, it was revealed that
the regulator failed to observe microeconomic impacts of subsidies on production
costs of newspapers. A second issue referred to the dilemma of funding printing
innovation in an environment of reduced circulation in print. Overall, while it
seemed undeniable that the FDM had actually improved business conditions over
the past decade, issues of overcapacity could not be resolved through these mod-
ernization grants.
On another level, however, the FDM scheme had addressed several important
questions for the first time. Notably, the need to invest into print media’s web
services had been given much higher attention in the wake of allocating the general
budget to the press (Etats ge´ne´raux de la presse e´crite). This political drive had
further led to an expansion of the scheme Fonds d’aide au de´veloppement des
Services en Ligne5 (FSL), a new fund to help newspaper publishers go online.
5 FSL was initially intended for the periodical press. The fund is now extended to all newspaper
publishers and pure players. Only news agencies continue to finance their digital development
projects via FDM.
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By this, the state provided an interesting incentive framework: It directed the
publisher’s investment plans into the future fitness of their businesses and, impor-
tantly, strengthened the market position of traditional print media houses in the
segment for online news provision at the expense of journalistic pure players.
13.4.2 The Second Sarkozy Plan of State Aid to the Press (2009)
From October to January 2009, French journalists, publishers, experts, and
members of parliament got together to discuss the future of the press in France.
The forum, called Etats ge´ne´raux de la presse e´crite, was held on the initiative of
the then President Nicolas Sarkozy. Its stated goals were to find ways to solve the
sector’s financial problems and to keep the press alive, pluralistic, and independent.
In January 2009, Sarkozy pledged to help the sector—to the tune of 600 million
euros over 3 years. The state measures were wide-reaching. A planned rise in postal
rates has been delayed by 1 year, the budget for government messages in the press
increases from 20 million to 36 million euros, and 70 million euros has been set
aside to fund home delivery of newspapers (up from a previous 8 million euros).
The government is also looking at ways to help press distributors financially
(notably by reducing social taxes by 30 %).
Further, in a bid to raise the interest in newspapers among the youth, those aged
18–24 will be offered a free weekly subscription to a newspaper of their choice as
from September. The newspapers are to be given by the publishers themselves.
Delivery would be paid for by government. Press unions expect 200,000 out of a
potential 750,000 people will take the grant during the scheme’s test phase. But the
money is not all for the print media, whose future is increasingly questioned. “If the
press does not take the internet turn it will have nothing to offer the generations
born in the digital age”, Sarkozy said. In April, the French parliament passed a bill
which grants online news publishers the same status as those in the print media. A
fund with 20 million euros has also been set up to help the press move into the
Internet era.
In addition to the 600 million euros budget, the government has also pledged to
help press publishers cut printing costs. It was assumed that this measure would
likely be more difficult to implement because it would effectively lead to lay-offs in
printing staff.
State aid was not the only outcome of the Etats ge´ne´raux. The forum also gave
birth to an independent initiative aiming to create a new code of practice for
journalists. As opposed to existing codes of practice, the new code, if adopted,
will feature in the profession’s collective labour agreement and therefore have more
clout. To come into effect, it will need the backing of unions and publishers.
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13.4.3 The Cardoso Report in 2010
After the Etats Ge´ne´raux de la Presse, President Sarkozy missioned Aldo
Cardoso—a consultant and managing director of Andersen for France—to review
state subsidies for press and suggest how to reform it. He gave the Ministers of
communications and of the budget a report on the State subsidies scheme on
September 8, 2010.
First Cardoso concluded that the country’s press has been kept in a state of
permanent artificial respiration by the huge amounts of financial state aid they
receive. Nearly 80 % of state grant is used to cover the operating costs of
newspapers’ companies and 20 % only goes for investments. Following so many
experts and previous reports, Cardoso reminds that government subsidies have
discouraged newspapers from finding sustainable financial strategies and have
failed to prompt the emergence of strong political and general and herd-news
newspapers not dependent on State grants.
The report lamented that the massive subsidies had failed to create the “emer-
gence or the presence of political and general press titles that were strong and not
dependent on public aid” (p. 2). In order to survive, Cardoso claimed, the French
press industry needed to shake up itself, with government pushing it into the right
direction. According to Cardoso, state aid would even discourage newspapers from
trying to find sustainable financial strategies. Cardoso did not call for an end to
public subsidies but suggests a notable reduction, from 1,026 million euros in 2010
to 835 million euros by 2016.
Overall, by end 2012, the French press subsidy scheme instruments covered:
• Direct subsidies:
1. Distribution aid
2. Aid for safeguarding editorial pluralism
3. Modernization aid
4. Other additional aid
• Indirect subsidies:
1. VAT reduction on sales revenues
2. Exemption from professional tax (Tables 13.4–13.7).
All in all, in 2010, the French press received over a billion euros in state
subsidies: some 400 million euros in indirect grants, and some 615 million euros
(Table 13.8).
Cardoso proposed 15 measures to reshape the press subsidies scheme and make
it conditional on innovation in the sector. Among them we highlight the following:
allocating subsidies to fund innovation projects, implementing accountability and
transparency in the way to allocate subsidies, and in checking the right use of them.
But Cardoso did not suggest abolishing the regulating philosophy. Rather, he
suggested refining press regulation by state and public bodies in a more efficient
way that is by building on an effective outcome-centred intervention strategy.
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Table 13.4 Distribution subsidies
2008 2009 2010
Postal subsidies 242 265.7 270
SNCF subsidies 5.8 5.5 5.8
Subsidies for distribution abroad 2 2 2
Newspaper distribution subsidies 8.2 70 70
Special help for distributors 0 58 0
Social security exemption for distributors 8 12
Total 258 409.2 359.8
Source: Cardoso (2010), in 1,000 euros
Table 13.5 Subsidies for safeguarding pluralism
2008 2009 2010
National dailies with low ad revenues 7 7 9
Subsidies for weekly newspaper 1.4 1.3 1.4
Subsidies for regional newspapers with low level of classifieds 1.4 1.3 1.4
Total 9.8 9.6 11.8
Source: Cardoso (2010), in 1,000 euros
Table 13.6 Modernization subsidies
2008 2009 2010
Social plan subsidies to daily newspapers 26.7 24.7 22.7
Modernization subsidies for distribution to the daily national press 12 12 12
Help for modernization of distribution 2 13 12
Modernization aid for online migration 0.5 20 19.5
Modernization aid for editing 20 25 24.2
Total 61.2 94.7 90.4
Source: Cardoso (2010), in 1,000 euros
Table 13.7 Other direct additional subsidies
2008 2009 2010
State subscription to AFPa 109 111 113
Restructuration help of Presstalisb 0 0 15
Printing subsidies (plan “imprime”) 0 0 25
Total 109 111 153
Source: Cardoso (2010), in 1,000 euros
aThe primary client of Agence France Presse (AFP), a government-chartered public corporation
operating under a 1957 law, is the French government, which purchases subscriptions for its
various services. In effect, those subscriptions are, however, an indirect subsidy to AFP. The
statutes of the agency prohibit direct government subsidies
bPresstalis, known until December 2009 as Nouvelles Messageries de la Presse Parisienne
(NMPP), is a French media distribution corporation. More than 100 newspapers and 3,500 French
and foreign magazines are distributed by Presstalis. In total, the company distributes many of the
national newspapers of France and nearly 80 % of its magazines and multimedia products, using a
network of distributors
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Conclusion
The intervention of the French state in the newspaper industry has often been
justified by the public service mission that daily newspapers would exercise in
ensuring the widest possible dissemination of information. From a historical
perspective, the state intervention took place in several stages. The first signifi-
cant step in the development of the press was the enactment of the 1881 law on
freedom of the press. The negative effect of the law was that political freedom
was not a sufficient condition ensuring the economic freedom of the press.
As is clear, the French state has played a hyperactive role in financially
supporting its newspaper industry over time,6 itself darkened by a disrupted
advertising market, escalating costs of production, and a growing disengagement
of readers disaffected by high cover prices. Both unique in amplitude and
diversity, governments of either side of the political spectrum have applied
generous shot-in-the-arm policies of financial assistance, indiscriminately
encompassing the greatest possible number of beneficiaries.
Additionally, another thrust of the interventionist ethos has survived in the
vast array of financial aid measures to the press funded by the state. Having
developed press subsidies long before the international wave of press concentra-
tion, the subsidy scheme in France is said to be the most costly and diversified in
Europe, building upon the main principle of non-discrimination towards its
beneficiaries. Laid down in a plethora of decrees, supplementary decrees,
ordinances, and policy documents, the scheme’s main objective has remained
to provide access to information for all citizens, to stimulate their participation in
public life, and to safeguard and promote the plurality of titles and thus diversity
of views.
Subsidies have strengthened the economics of newspapers over the decades,
so much that these subsidies are nowadays salient guarantors of survival for
many newspapers, in particular the national daily press (Charon 2005; Le Floch
2006; Mathien 2003; Murschetz 1997; Schwartzenberg 2007). In all, analysts,
commentators, and newspaper executives disagree on the success of state aid to
Table 13.8 Total direct and indirect aid to newspapers in France
Total direct aid 438 624.5 615
Exemption from commercial tax 200 200 200
VAT reduction 200 200 200
Other 1 1 1
Total indirect aid 401 401 401
Total aid 839 1,025.5 1,016
Source: Cardoso (2010), in 1,000 euros
6 In 2008, direct subsidies accounted for 60 % of revenues of France-Soir and 30 % of
L’Humanite´, ignoring all other indirect aid (Cardoso 2010). In 2012, France-Soir went bankrupt.
It is obvious that this system did not solve structural problems.
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the press as much as politicians argue about its desirability (Truffy 2010). But
while the struggle for audiences and advertisers has heated up, with a daily
French newspaper industry continuously in danger of becoming a footnote of
national media progress, scepticism has emerged about the value of government
intervention resulting in the authorities’ decision to gradually and relentlessly
prune major parts of aid to its press while compensating these reductions with
some new instruments, moves much in dissonance with the past. In an advice to
the 2012 finance bill, presented by the MP Michel Franc¸aix (Parti Socialiste, i.e.
the socialist party that holds the parliamentary majority since May 2012) this
ethos of “continuity goes change” has been prolonged (Franc¸aix 2012). There,
the MP called for focusing on the titles that are the most in need that is the not-
for-profit citizen press of quality content. These papers would benefit from only
30 % of public aid.
When asked whether the subsidy scheme to French daily newspapers is
successful and coherent in financially strengthening a French newspaper market
best thought to exemplify a failed market, only a few specialists have considered
the regime to be a success, while the majority pointed to deficiencies regarding
its capacity to enable both an effective marketplace for press goods and a
democratic marketplace for ideas. As regards the scheme’s intention to
strengthen the daily newspaper market, most analysts agreed on its fragility. A
need for reform was inevitable should the scheme ever become more effective. It
now appears that the state has failed to create the conditions for an economic
system that would allow publishers to be in a strong position to meet the new
challenges. Today, the urgency is not to simply reform the system. Stated
simply, it is not about to improve the efficacy of the scheme’s design but to
question the overall legitimacy of a regime which has historically failed to
guarantee the economic survival of the French press.
To conclude, critics of the scheme have pushed into the spotlight the argument
that state aid has been far too ineffective and has aimed principally at merely
preserving the appearance rather than the reality of a pluralistic press. Freiberg
(1981) critically commented on this phenomenon as follows: “If the European
states had been truly interested in such a press [i.e., pluralistic], they could have
done far more to protect the financial integrity of the small enterprises from the
monopolistic practices of the larger ones. ‘Laissez faire’ in the realm of the press
is an active state policy: ‘Laissez mourir’. The aid policies of the French state
have clearly served to help big capital in the sector at least as much as small and
medium capital; at the same time, though, they have helped legitimate the
‘neutral’ state apparatus” (Freiberg 1981, pp. 171–172).
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